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Abstract—We introduce a privacy-signaling game problem
in which a transmitter with privacy concerns observes a pair
of correlated random variables which are modeled as jointly
Gaussian. The transmitter aims to hide one of these random
variables and convey the other one whereas the objective of the
receiver is to accurately estimate both of the random variables.
These conflicting objectives are analyzed in a game theoretic
framework where depending on the commitment conditions (of
the sender), we consider Nash or Stackelberg equilibria. We
show that for scalar sources a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium
among all admissible policies is attained by affine policies. We
prove that these Nash equilibria coincide with the Stackelberg
equilibria. We also show that there always exists an informative
Stackelberg equilibrium for the multidimensional parameter
setting. We revisit the information bottleneck problem within our
Stackelberg framework where under the information bottleneck
setup the sender observes only one of the parameters. We
characterize the Stackelberg equilibria under certain conditions
and when these conditions are not met we establish the existence
of informative equilibria.
Index Terms—Signaling games, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg
equilibrium, privacy, estimation, information bottleneck.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SYSTEM MODEL
Various applications such as social networks, networked
control, smart grid and crowd sensing benefit from data col-
lected from decision makers. In these applications, users share
information with a service provider which wishes to improve
the quality of service by utilizing information gathered from
the users. The users as well are interested in enhanced service
quality as they benefit from the service while at the same
time they wish to retain a certain level of privacy. The privacy
objective arises from the fact that the information they wish
to convey to the service provider may be correlated with
certain private information they want to protect. For instance,
in smart grid applications, power usage information shared
by the users with the service provider may disclose some
information related to users such as their habits and behaviors
[2], [3]. For that reason, privacy is a major challenge in
smart grid applications and this is a current research topic
in numerous studies (see [3]–[6] and references therein). The
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Fig. 1. Communication setting.
problem of preserving privacy while maintaining reasonable
system performance appears in various contexts [7]–[17].
In this manuscript, we consider the following communica-
tion scenario between a sender and a receiver motivated by
the aforementioned applications. There is a pair of messages
at the sender and the perspective of the sender is such that
one message needs to be protected and the other message
needs to be conveyed. As opposed to the sender, the receiver
desires to accurately estimate both messages with the aim of
acquiring as much information as possible. Under this setting,
we investigate the interactions between the sender and the
receiver whose objectives are different from each other due
to the privacy concerns of the transmitter.
Consider an information transmission scenario in which a
sender encodes a pair of correlated random variables x and y
into z using an encoding function denoted by z = γe(x, y)
and a receiver wants to decode both of the random variables.
In this communication scenario, the sender wishes to convey
information contained in y whereas it views x as a private
parameter that needs to be hidden from the receiver. Suppose
that there is a channel between the sender and the receiver
characterized by a conditional distribution p(r|z) where r
denotes the observation of the receiver. The aim of the receiver
is to accurately estimate both parameters given its observation
r. Let the decoders for estimating x and y at the receiver
be denoted by γdX (r) and γdY (r), respectively. Figure 1
illustrates the considered information transmission scenario.
We model the parameters x and y as jointly Gaussian
distributed random variables. Let (x, y) be a zero mean
Gaussian distributed random vector with a positive definite
covariance matrix Σ ,
[
σ2X ρ
ρ σ2Y
]
and a nonzero correlation,
i.e., ρ 6= 0. It is assumed that the joint distribution of x and y
is common knowledge, i.e., both players know σ2X , σ
2
Y and ρ.
Since x and y are correlated, transmitting y directly discloses
information related to the private parameter x. In other words,
the objectives of hiding x and conveying y are conflicting.
These conflicting objectives at the transmitter are modeled via
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2the following objective function:
Je(γe, γdX , γdY ) = E[(γdY (r)− y)2]− δ E[(γdX (r)− x)2]
(1)
which is to be minimized, where δ is a positive design
parameter that determines the level of desired privacy in terms
of hiding x. On the other hand, the receiver aims to extract
both of the parameters. Thus, the receiver wishes to minimize
the following objective function:
Jd(γe, γdX , γdY ) = E[(γdX (r)− x)2] + E[(γdY (r)− y)2].
(2)
In (2), the mean squared errors corresponding to parameters
x and y are incorporated into the objective function with
equal weights since taking different weights does not alter
the problem. In this work, we investigate the Nash and the
Stackelberg equilibria for the described strategic information
transmission scenario in which the objectives of the sender
and the receiver are as defined above.
The game dynamics for the Nash equilibrium are as follows.
Each player chooses its strategy simultaneously. These chosen
strategies are referred to as a Nash equilibrium if no player
gains by unilaterally deviating from its strategy. In other
words, neither the sender nor the receiver would have any
incentive to unilaterally change their strategies when they
operate at a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that the set of possible
strategies for the encoder is denoted by Γe, i.e., γe ∈ Γe, and
those for the decoders of each parameter are denoted by ΓdX
and ΓdY , i.e., γdX ∈ ΓdX and γdY ∈ ΓdY . A set of policies
γe,∗, γdX ,∗ and γdY ,∗ forms a Nash equilibrium if [18]
Je(γe,∗, γdX ,∗, γdY ,∗) ≤ Je(γe, γdX ,∗, γdY ,∗) (3)
for all γe ∈ Γe and
Jd(γe,∗, γdX ,∗, γdY ,∗) ≤ Jd(γe,∗, γdX , γdY ) (4)
for all γdX ∈ ΓdX and γdY ∈ ΓdY .
On the other hand, the Stackelberg equilibrium involves a
sequential game play in the sense that first the sender and
then the receiver act. The sender chooses and announces its
strategy and then the receiver acts upon learning the strategy
of the sender. Once the sender announces its strategy, it cannot
change it, i.e., the sender commits to employ this announced
strategy. The receiver employs an optimal response to the
announced strategy of the sender, which is known by the
receiver before taking an action. A set of policies γe,∗, γdX ,∗
and γdY ,∗ forms a Stackelberg equilibrium if [18]
Je(γe,∗, γdX ,∗(γe,∗),γdY ,∗(γe,∗))
≤ Je(γe, γdX ,∗(γe), γdY ,∗(γe)) (5)
for all γe ∈ Γe, where γdX ,∗(γe) and γdY ,∗(γe) are such that
Jd(γe, γdX ,∗(γe),γdY ,∗(γe))
≤ Jd(γe, γdX (γe), γdY (γe)) (6)
for all γdX ∈ ΓdX and γdY ∈ ΓdY .
A. Literature Review
For signaling games under the Nash equilibrium concept,
Crawford and Sobel in their foundational paper [19] inves-
tigate a communication scenario between a better informed
sender and a receiver where sender’s cost contains a bias term
leading to misaligned objectives. They obtain the interesting
result that under some technical conditions the sender needs
to quantize the information it sends at a Nash equilibrium. To
put it differently, the misalignment in the objectives results in
information hiding through quantization of the sent message.
In contrast to Crawford and Sobel, the Bayesian persuasion
problem considers the Stackelberg equilibrium concept rather
than the Nash equilibrium concept [20]. Recently, the SIT
problem attracted attention also in the communication and
control theory literature [21]–[29]. For instance, the work
[22] considers quadratic costs with a bias term appearing in
sender’s cost and investigates both scalar and multidimensional
parameter settings. An interesting observation from [22] is the
existence of a linear Nash equilibrium which is in contrast
to the quantized nature of the equilibrium in Crawford and
Sobel. In [23], the misalignment in the objectives is due to a
bias term which is modeled as a random variable. The authors
consider the Stackelberg equilibrium concept and focus on
affine policies. In [24], a communication scenario between
prospect theoretic agents whose cost functions are distorted
by subjective biases is investigated using the Stackelberg
equilibrium concept.
In the literature, several studies consider the SIT problem
in which the sender takes privacy of certain information
into account by employing a suitable privacy measure, under
either the Nash or Stackelberg criteria [30]–[33]. In these
studies, a common theme is to model private and nonprivate
parameters as jointly Gaussian random variables. In [30],
a communication scenario between a sender and a receiver
is investigated using the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in
which an additional side information is assumed to be available
at the receiver. The estimation errors are measured using
quadratic costs and a family of Stackelberg equilibria is
characterized under an a priori affine policy assumption. In
contrast, here, we do not restrict the policies to be affine a
priori and we consider a setting with no side information.
Also, we investigate Nash equilibria as well and show that
a payoff dominant equilibrium is attained by affine policies.
We use this result to show that the Stackelberg equilibria
are also affine even when the sender is not restricted to the
affine class. The work in [31] also investigates a Stackelberg
game where the utility measure for the nonprivate parameter
is quadratic and the privacy measure is entropy based. Both
noiseless and noisy communication scenarios are considered
and (essentially) unique linear encoding and decoding policies
that form a Stackelberg equilibrium are characterized. In [32],
a Nash game is studied where the privacy measure is based on
mutual information and the utility measure for the nonprivate
parameter is quadratic. In [32], apart from the previously
described Gaussian scenario, another scenario in which private
and nonprivate data are treated as discrete random variables is
considered.
3The tradeoff between utility and privacy appears also in
various other contexts [8]–[17], [34]–[38]. One line of related
work is the differential privacy literature where the main
problem of interest is to protect private information on publicly
available databases [36], [37]. The notion of differential pri-
vacy ensures that private information provided by an individual
to a database is not compromised by a third party, e.g.,
data analyst, who retrieves information from this database.
There is a growing interest in differential privacy in many
different fields including control theory [9], [12], [34]. In this
context, an interesting result from [9] is the application of the
Laplacian or Gaussian perturbations to guarantee differential
privacy. For a comprehensive treatment of differential privacy
on such problems as filtering and estimation, please see [39].
Another line of work is the privacy funnel problem [35],
[38] which have connections with the information bottleneck
technique [40]. In the information bottleneck technique, the
aim is to compress an observed random variable while trying
to preserve information related to another correlated random
variable which is not observed [40]. The information bot-
tleneck problem specializing to Gaussian random variables
is investigated in [41] where the parameters of interest are
jointly Gaussian vectors. The compression objective in the
information bottleneck problem can also be viewed as a
privacy objective as in our framework in the sense that the
corresponding information is desired to be removed from
the revealed message. In the information bottleneck problem,
the costs involve mutual information and only one of the
parameters is received at the sender whereas in our framework
the costs include mean squared error terms and both of the
parameters are observed at the sender. In order to provide an
estimation theoretic perspective on the information bottleneck
problem, we formulate a similar problem where we use mean
squared error terms for the costs as in our original setting
and we show that there are operational and consequential
differences when the encoder is allowed to use both of the
hidden variables. In the privacy funnel problem, it is desired to
convey as much information as possible related to an observed
random variable while trying to leak as low information
as possible related to an unobserved private parameter. It
should be noted that in the privacy funnel problem, only
the nonprivate parameter is observed at the sender whereas
in our framework, we assume that both the nonprivate and
private parameters are observed at the sender. Another related
work is [17] where the tradeoff between utility and privacy
is investigated through formulating constrained optimization
problems that consider settings with a discrete parameter and a
continuous parameter. The continuous parameter case focuses
on Gaussian perturbations applied to the nonprivate parameter
to protect private information.
B. Contributions of the Manuscript
The main aim of this manuscript is to provide both Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria analyses for the considered privacy-
signaling game problem. In game theory, since the solution
concept involves an equilibrium (Nash, Stackelberg, and re-
finements), one cannot talk about an optimal equilibrium in
general. Nonetheless, as a main contribution of our work,
we establish and compute an equilibrium, which is desirable
among all, for both of the players. The main contributions of
this manuscript can be summarized as follows:
• In the literature, a Nash equilibrium analysis of the
privacy game problem, in which both the privacy and
the utility (for the nonprivate parameter) are measured
via the mean squared error cost, has not been available.
In this manuscript, we consider this problem for the first
time in the literature to our knowledge. More importantly,
we show that the most desirable Nash equilibrium (for
both players) is the affine equilibrium in Theorem 1
considering the noiseless communication setting. This
payoff dominance result is obtained by first explicitly
characterizing the affine Nash equilibria and then formu-
lating an equivalent problem. In addition, we establish
the uniqueness of the characterized affine Nash equilibria
based on the proposed equivalent formulation.
• We show that the characterized affine Nash equilibria
coincide with the Stackelberg equilibria in Theorem 3.
It should be emphasized that in characterizing the Stack-
elberg equilibria, we do not make an affine policy restric-
tion. In other words, if we consider the optimization prob-
lem that the encoder needs to solve while obtaining the
Stackelberg equilibria, the characterized affine policies
are the optimal solution among any sets of policies. In
addition, our Stackelberg equilibrium analysis comprises
a uniqueness result among the affine class of policies.
• We show that there always exists an informative Stack-
elberg equilibrium for the multidimensional parameter
setting in Theorem 6.
• We provide a game theoretic perspective on the informa-
tion bottleneck problem by formulating it as a Stackelberg
game under the mean squared error distortion criterion for
the case of multidimensional sources. We characterize
the Stackelberg equlibria under certain conditions in
Theorem 7. For the cases when these conditions are not
met, we establish the existence of informative equilibria
in Theorem 8. In the special case of scalar sources, we
explicitly characterize the equilibria, which is either fully
informative or noninformative depending on an explicit
condition, in Corollary 1.
• We extend our results on the noiseless channel setting
with scalar sources to the additive Gaussian noise chan-
nel setting which is commonly encountered in practice.
Under this setting, it is shown that a payoff dominant
Nash equilibrium is attained by linear policies, which
are explicitly characterized, in Theorem 9. This theorem
also establishes that the characterized linear Nash equi-
librium is unique among the affine class. We also show
that the Nash equilibria coincide with the Stackelberg
equilibrium in Theorem 10. In addition, the characterized
linear Stackelberg equilibrium is unique among any set
of policies.
• We also establish the existence of nonlinear Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria considering a discrete channel
setting in which the encoding function is restricted to
4take discrete values in Theorem 11 and Theorem 12,
respectively.
The remainder of the manuscript is organized as follows.
Section II provides Nash and Stackelberg equilibria analyses
considering the noiseless channel.Section III presents our
results for the multidimensional case. Section IV investigates
the information bottleneck problem as an instance of our
proposed framework. Section V-A and Section V-B extend the
results to the Gaussian noise channel and discrete channel,
respectively. Section VI provides numerical examples, and
Section VII concludes the manuscript with some final remarks.
II. NOISELESS CHANNEL BETWEEN THE SENDER AND THE
RECEIVER
In this section, we consider a noiseless communication
scenario. The receiver has direct access to the encoded random
variable z, i.e., r = z. In addition, we assume that there is a
power constraint E[z2] ≤ P at the transmitter where P , which
takes a finite positive value, represents the maximum average
power. Under this setting, the sender can transmit a real valued
z for which the average power constraint is satisfied.
A. Nash Equilibria
In the following theorem, we show that payoff dominant
Nash equilibria are affine and we explicitly characterize these
equilibria. A payoff dominant Nash equilibrium is the most
desirable equilibrium for both of the players (among all
coding/decoding policies, including those that are non-linear)
in a sense that is made explicit in the following definition [42].
Definition 1: A Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto domi-
nated1 by any other Nash equilibrium of the game is said to
be a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1:
(i) The encoding policies γe(x, y) = C for all |C| ≤ √P
and the decoding policy γdX (r) = 0 and γdY (r) = 0
form a noninformative Nash equilibrium.2
(ii) There exist informative affine Nash equilibria in which
the decoding policies, γdX (r) = Kr+L and γdY (r) =
Mr +N , satisfy
M
K
=
δσ2x + σ
2
y
2ρ
+
√
(δσ2x + σ
2
y)
2 − 4δρ2
2ρ
(7)
with P˜ (K,L,M,N) ≤ (M2 − δK2)2P , and L and N
are such that either N/L = M/K or L = N = 0 holds.
Also, the corresponding encoding policy, γe(x, y) =
Ax+By + C, is given by
A = −δK/(M2 − δK2), (8)
B = M/(M2 − δK2), (9)
C = −L/K. (10)
1A set of policies γe(·, ·), γdX (·) and γdY (·) Pareto dominates an-
other set of policies γ˜e(·, ·), γ˜dX (·) and γ˜dY (·) if Je(γe, γdX , γdY ) ≤
Je(γ˜e, γ˜dX , γ˜dY ), Jd(γe, γdX , γdY ) ≤ Jd(γ˜e, γ˜dX , γ˜dY ) and at least
one of these inequalities is strict.
2We refer to an equilibrium as noninformative if the sender does not convey
information related to both of the parameters at this equilibrium and this is
equivalent to what is known as a babbling equilibrium in the signaling games
literature. In the converse case, the equilibrium is referred to as informative.
(iii) These informative equilibria are payoff dominant Nash
equilibria. In addition, they are unique among the affine
class of policies.
Proof: In the rest of this subsection, we prove Theorem
1, where we focus on (ii) and (iii). We first characterize affine
Nash equilibria and then we prove their payoff dominance
property among all encoding and decoding policies, including
those that are non-linear. Towards that goal, we first need the
best responses of each player specializing to affine policies.
Lemma 1: When the encoder is affine and it is expressed as
z = Ax+ By + C, the decoders are also affine and they are
given by
γdX (r) =
(
Aσ2X +Bρ
A2σ2X +B
2σ2Y + 2ABρ
)
(r − C), (11)
γdY (r) =
(
Aρ+Bσ2Y
A2σ2X +B
2σ2Y + 2ABρ
)
(r − C). (12)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Having characterized the best response of the receiver to
affine encoding policies, we next analyze the best response of
the sender to affine decoding policies.
Lemma 2: Define P˜ (K,L,M,N) , δ2σ2XK2 + σ2YM2 −
2δρKM + (MN − δKL)2. When the decoders are affine in
the form of γdX (z) = Kz + L and γdY (z) = Mz + N , the
optimal encoder is specified by
γe(x, y) =
M(y −N)− δK(x− L)
M2 − δK2 (13)
if P˜ (K,L,M,N) ≤ (M2 − δK2)2P and M2 > δK2; and
otherwise by
γe(x, y) =
√
PM (y −N)−√PδK (x− L)√
P˜ (K,L,M,N)
. (14)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Thus far, the best responses of affine encoding and decoding
policies are explored. To sum up, it is shown that the optimal
decoding policies are affine when the encoder is affine and
also the optimal encoding policy is affine when the decoders
are affine.
Now, suppose that the system parameters and the terms
that specify the decoding policies are such that the optimal
encoding policy is as in (13). Namely, it is assumed that
M2 > δK2 and P˜ (K,L,M,N) ≤ P (M2 − δK2)2 hold.
In the following, a Nash equilibrium analysis is carried out
under these two assumptions.
To begin with, by combining (11)-(13), the following fixed
point equations are obtained:
K =
(M2 − δK2)(ρM − δσ2xK)
σ2yM
2 + δ2σ2xK
2 − 2δρKM , (15)
L =
(MN − δKL)(ρM − δσ2xK)
σ2yM
2 + δ2σ2xK
2 − 2δρKM , (16)
M =
(M2 − δK2)(σ2yM − δρK)
σ2yM
2 + δ2σ2xK
2 − 2δρKM , (17)
N =
(MN − δKL)(σ2yM − δρK)
σ2yM
2 + δ2σ2xK
2 − 2δρKM . (18)
5After some algebraic manipulations, (16) and (18) lead to
the same expression N(δσ2xK − ρM) = L(δρK − σ2yM). If
L = N = 0, this equality holds and otherwise noting that
M/K = (δρK − σ2yM)/(δσ2xK − ρM) from (15) and (17),
we get MK =
N
L .
Now, it remains to take (15) and (17) into account in order
to characterize an equilibrium. After dividing both sides of
(15) and (17) by K and defining q , M/K, we obtain
1 =
(q2−δ)(qρ−δσ2x)
q2σ2y−2δρq+δ2σ2x and q =
(q2−δ)(qσ2y−δρ)
q2σ2y−2δρq+δ2σ2x , and these can
simultaneously be solved if
q2ρ− q(δσ2x + σ2y) + δρ = 0. (19)
Note that in order for (19) to be solvable, it is required that
(δσ2x+σ
2
y)
2−4δρ2 ≥ 0 or equivalently (δσ2x+σ2y)−2
√
δ|ρ| ≥
0. In the following, we will show that this condition is always
satisfied. Towards that goal, define f(δ) , (δσ2x + σ2y) −
2
√
δ|ρ|. Taking the derivative of f(δ) with respect to δ and
equating it to zero, we get δ˜ = ρ2/σ4x. By applying the
second derivative test, we can conclude that this δ˜ achieves
the minimum of f(δ) and the value at this minimal point
is given by f(δ˜) =
σ2xσ
2
y−ρ2
σ2x
. Through the positive semi-
definiteness property of covariance matrices, it follows that
f(δ˜) ≥ 0. Since any δ satisfies f(δ) ≥ f(δ˜), it is concluded
that the condition for the existence of a solution to (19)
is always met. Moreover, as Σ is assumed to be positive
definite, the inequality is always strict which leads to the fact
that (19) has always two roots. Therefore, the solutions of
(M/K)2ρ− (M/K)(δσ2x +σ2y) + δρ = 0, which always exist
as already shown, satisfy the fixed point equations in (15) and
(17). Moreover, recall that at the beginning of this proof we
assumed that M2 > δK2, equivalently q2 > δ, holds. In the
following, this condition is taken into account. Note that the
right hand side of (7) corresponds to one of the roots of (19).
By inserting this root into q2 > δ, we get
δσ2x + σ
2
y
ρ
δσ2x + σ2y
ρ
+
√
(δσ2x + σ
2
y)
2 − 4δρ2
ρ
 > 4δ.
(20)
Next, after defining s , δσ
2
x+σ
2
y
ρ , (20) leads to
√
s2 − 4δ > −s
when ρ > 0 and to
√
s2 − 4δ > s when ρ < 0. Since the
left hand side and the right hand side of both inequalities
are positive and negative, respectively, both inequalities and
consequently the inequality in (20) are satisfied. Furthermore,
via a similar analysis, it can be shown that the second root of
(19) does not satisfy the condition of M2 > δK2. Finally, the
corresponding encoding policy at this equilibrium is as in (13),
which leads to the expressions in (8)-(10). In fact, a similar
analysis can be carried out to show that there does not exist
an equilibrium when the optimal encoding policy is as in (14),
which implies the uniqueness of the derived equilibria among
the affine class. However, we take a more intuitive approach
in the following.
Next, we establish our main results on the equilibrium
behavior for the noiseless setup, in particular the property that
the informative affine equilibria lead to the payoff dominant
(x, y) T γ˜e(u, v)
(u, v)
p(r | z)z r
γdU (r)
γdV (r)
(u˜, v˜)
u˜
v˜
T −1 (xˆ, yˆ)
Fig. 2. Equivalent formulation where T denotes the linear transformation
specified in (21)-(22).
equilibrium, and such an equilibrium is in fact unique. Towards
that goal, we show that in a linearly transformed orthogonal
coordinate system the sender wishes to fully reveal one co-
ordinate whereas wants to hide the other coordinate. In the
following, we take the revealed message at the characterized
equilibria as one coordinate and take the other coordinate
as orthogonal to the revealed message. In other words, we
linearly transform (x, y) into (u, v) such that u corresponds
to the revealed parameter and v is independent of u. It
is noted that this transformation is invertible, i.e., one can
recover (x, y) from (u, v). In particular, consider the following
transformation from the pair (x, y) to the pair (u, v):
u =
(
−δσ
2
X + σ
2
Y
2δρ
−
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2
2δρ
)
y + x,
(21)
v =
(
−δσ
2
X + σ
2
Y
2δρ
+
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2
2δρ
)
y + x.
(22)
We propose an equivalent problem under this linear transfor-
mation. The encoder consists of two consecutive mappings one
of which is fixed as above and the other one can arbitrarily be
chosen by the sender. In other words, there is a linear mapping
from (x, y) to (u, v) fixed as above and then an encoding
function z = γ˜e(u, v). At the receiver side, we also consider
a similar setting. The observation at the receiver is mapped
into u˜ and v˜ via γdU (r) and γdV (r), respectively, which can
arbitrarily be selected by the receiver. Then, these auxiliary
variables are mapped into estimates of x and y as follows:
γdX (r) =
γdU (r) + γdV (r)
2
+
(γdV (r)− γdU (r))(δσ2X + σ2Y )
2
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2 , (23)
γdY (r) =
(γdV (r)− γdU (r))δρ√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2 . (24)
Fig. 2 provides an illustration for the equivalent formulation.
Since the proposed transformation is invertible, the problem
in the transform domain is equivalent to the original problem.
Then, we express the objective functions of each player in
terms of the parameters in the transformed coordinate system.
6The objective function of the sender can be written as
Je(γ˜e, γdU , γdV ) =
δ
2
(
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2 − 1
)
E[(u− γdU (r))2]
+
δ
2
(
− (δσ
2
X + σ
2
Y )√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2 − 1
)
E[(v − γdV (r))2],
(25)
where the first coefficient is positive and the second coefficient
is negative. Similarly, if we express the objective function
of the receiver in terms of the parameters in the introduced
coordinate system, we get
Jd(γ˜e, γdU , γdV ) = w1E[(u− γdU (r))2]
+ w2E[(v − γdV (r))2] + w3E[(u− γdU (r))(v − γdV (r))],
(26)
where w1 ,
(
1
2 − (δσ
2
X+σ
2
Y )
2
√
(δσ2X+σ
2
Y )
2−4δρ2
)2
+ δ
2ρ2
(δσ2X+σ
2
Y )
2−4δρ2 ,
w2 ,
(
1
2 +
(δσ2X+σ
2
Y )
2
√
(δσ2X+σ
2
Y )
2−4δρ2
)2
+ δ
2ρ2
(δσ2X+σ
2
Y )
2−4δρ2 and
w3 , − 2δρ
2(1+δ)
(δσ2X+σ
2
Y )
2−4δρ2 . In the proposed equivalent problem,
the optimal γdU (r) and γdV (r) for a given encoding policy
γ˜e(u, v) are the minimum mean squared error estimators of
the corresponding parameters, as stated below.
Proposition 1: For a fixed encoding function γ˜e(u, v), the
optimal γdU (r) and γdV (r) that minimize (26) are given by
E[u|r] and E[v|r], respectively.
Proof: The result is proven using the completion of the
squares technique. Suppose that γdU (r) = E[u|r] + g(r) and
γdV (r) = E[v|r] + h(r). Inserting these expressions into the
objective function of the receiver, we get
Jd(g, h) =w1E[(u− E[u|r])2] + w2E[(v − E[v|r])2]
+ w3E[(u− E[u|r])(v − E[v|r])]
+ E[w1g(r)2 + w2h(r)2 + w3g(r)h(r)]. (27)
Notice that the first three terms correspond to the objective
value when the minimum mean squared error estimators are
employed. Now, observe that
E[w1g(r)2 + w2h(r)2 + w3g(r)h(r)] =
E
[(
g(r)
(1
2
− (δσ
2
X + σ
2
Y )
2
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2
)
+ h(r)
(1
2
+
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2
))2]
+
δ2ρ2
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2E[(g(r) + h(r))
2] ≥ 0. (28)
It follows that Jd(g, h) ≥ w1E[(u − E[u|r])2] + w2E[(v −
E[v|r])2] + w3E[(u − E[u|r])(v − E[v|r])] which shows the
optimality of the minimum mean squared error estimators.
In the equivalent formulation, the objective function of the
sender contains two mean squared error terms corresponding
to independent random variables u and v where the sender
wishes to transmit u whereas wants to protect v. The receiver
still employs the minimum mean squared error estimators
corresponding to u and v for a given encoding policy. Next,
we use the equivalent formulation to obtain the uniqueness and
payoff dominance results. Towards that goal, we first present
the following lemma.
Lemma 3: At a Nash equilibrium, the sender does not
transmit any information related to the linear combination (of
the private and nonprivate parameters) v specified by (22).
Proof: Suppose that the sender employs an encoding
policy γ˜e(u, v) which conveys information related to both
parameters. In response to this encoding policy, it is optimal
for the receiver to employ the minimum mean squared error
estimators of each parameter, as shown in Proposition 1.
Denote these estimators by f(r) and g(r) for estimating u
and v, respectively. Assume that the mean squared error for
estimating v with the corresponding optimal estimator g(r) is
less than σ2V , i.e., E[(v − g(r))2] < σ2V . In response to the
decoding policies of f(r) and g(r), the sender can switch to
the following policy to improve its objective value. Instead of
sending z = γ˜e(u, v), the sender can transmit z = γ˜e(u, n)
while keeping the encoding function γ˜e(·, ·) the same where
n follows the same distribution as v and is independent of u
and v. In that case, the performance for estimating u remains
the same since receiving γ˜e(u, v) or γ˜e(u, n) are equivalent
for the decoding policy f(r). However, the performance for
estimating v degrades as shown in the following:
E[(v − g(r))2] = E[v2]− 2E[vg(r)] + E[g(r)2]
= E[v2]− 2E[v]E[g(r)] + E[g(r)2]
= E[v2] + E[g(r)2] ≥ σ2V , (29)
where the second equality is due to the fact that v and r are
independent in case γ˜e(u, n) is transmitted. Since the sender
wishes to hide v (see (25)), the sender gains by employing z =
γ˜e(u, n) instead of z = γ˜e(u, v). As a result, any encoding
policy which yields E[(v− γdV (r))2] < σ2V cannot be a Nash
equilibrium since in that case the sender can change its strategy
to improve its objective value.
From Lemma 3, it follows that the performance of each
player at a Nash equilibrium is determined by the mean
squared error for estimating u and this result is valid for
any coding/decoding policies including non-linear ones. Since
transmitting an affine function of u yields the minimum attain-
able performance for both players, this is a payoff dominant
Nash equilibrium, i.e., the most desirable equilibria for both
players among all coding/decoding policies including non-
linear ones.
Since the receiver cannot transmit information related to v,
the only possible affine Nash equilibria correspond to sending
an affine function of u satisfying the average power constraint,
which gives the equilibria in the statement of the theorem.
Thus, the characterized equilibria are unique among the affine
class.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 characterizes a family of informative
affine Nash equilibria in which the transmitted information is
the same for the whole family, i.e., for the encoding policy
γe(x, y) = Ax + By + C the ratio B/A is always the same
at the characterized equilibria, and these equilibria lead to the
7same performance values. Thus, these affine equilibria may be
viewed to be essentially unique.
Remark 2: Note that when δ → 0+, the encoding and
decoding policies satisfy M/K → σ2y/ρ, A → 0 and
B → 1/M as can be deduced from (7), (8) and (9). Therefore,
δ → 0+ implies that the encoder transmits directly y at a Nash
equilibrium. When δ = 0, the sender also transmits y directly
at a Nash equilibrium since it does not have any privacy
concern in this case. Hence, the Nash equilibrium specified
in Theorem 1 as δ → 0+ coincides with the Nash equilibrium
when δ = 0.
Remark 3: It is seen that the ratio of B and A converges
to −σ2x/ρ as δ →∞, which can be verified from (7), (8) and
(9). This shows that in the high privacy regime, the encoder
makes the revealed information z and the private parameter x
essentially uncorrelated.
Theorem 1 characterizes a family of equilibria in which
there is communication between the transmitter and the re-
ceiver. Hence, the considered game always admits informative
affine Nash equilibria regardless of the system parameters.
More importantly, these affine equilibria are the most desirable
equilibria for both of the players.
B. Convergence to Informative Affine Nash Equilibria under
Best Response Dynamics
In this subsection, we investigate the convergence behavior
of fixed point iterations. In particular, we consider an initial
linear encoding policy that does not yield a Nash equilibrium
and then we update the policies of each player in an iterative
manner by calculating the best responses. The aim is to see if
an initial linear encoding strategy which does not yield a Nash
equilibrium converges to an informative Nash equilibrium
as a result of fixed point iterations. The following theorem
provides a necessary and sufficient condition for reaching an
informative Nash equilibrium. In the following, we employ the
equivalent formulation used in the proof of Theorem 1 which
facilitates the analysis.
Theorem 2: Consider an initial linear encoding policy
γ˜e(u, v) = Au + Bv with A 6= 0 and B 6= 0, which does
not lead to a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that best responses
of the players are computed in an iterative manner starting
from this initial encoding strategy. These fixed point iterations
converge to an informative Nash equilibrium if and only if
σ2U > σ
2
V δ˜, where the variances σ
2
U and σ
2
V can be computed
using the definitions of u and v in (21) and (22), respectively,
and δ˜ is defined as
δ˜ , (δσ
2
X + σ
2
Y ) +
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )−
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2 . (30)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 2 presents a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion, which depends only on the system parameters such as
σX , σY , ρ and δ, to reach an informative Nash equilibrium as
a result of fixed point iterations. This result has an important
implication in terms of numerical stability. In case the encoder
and decoder have slightly different initializations or priors, and
the derived condition is not met, it means that it is not possible
to reach an informative Nash equilibrium via updating policies
in an iterative manner.
C. Stackelberg Equilibria
The equivalent formulation employed in the proof of The-
orem 1 is again useful for characterizing the Stackelberg
equilibria. It is important to emphasize that in the following
analysis the set of possible encoding strategies, i.e., Γe, is not
restricted to the affine class.
Lemma 4: At a Stackelberg equilibrium, the sender does not
transmit any information related to the linear combination (of
the private and nonprivate parameters) v specified by (22).
Proof: We will show that any encoding policy which
yields E[(v − g(r))2] < σ2V cannot be a Stackelberg equilib-
rium via a similar analysis to that employed in Lemma 3. To-
wards that goal, we compare the performance of two scenarios
from the perspective of the sender. Recall that in a Stackelberg
equilibrium the sender chooses a policy and announces this
policy to the receiver and the receiver acts with the knowledge
of sender’s policy. In the first scenario, the encoder chooses a
policy γ˜e(·, ·) and the receiver employs its optimal response.
Assume that E[(v − γdV (r))2] < σ2V with the corresponding
set of policies. In the second scenario, suppose that the encoder
chooses the same policy as before with the exception that
the sender replaces v by an independent noise following the
same distribution as v. As the sender announces its strategy,
the optimal response of the receiver for parameter v becomes
γdV (r) = E[v|r] = E[v] = 0 due to the independence of v
and r. Therefore, we get E[(v− γdV (r))2] = σ2V in this case.
Notice that the mean squared error performance in estimating
u is the same for both scenarios. As a result, the second
scenario yields better performance for the sender (see (25)).
Thus, transmitting information related to v is not desirable for
the sender.
Theorem 3: The Stackelberg equilibria coincide with the
informative Nash equilibria characterized in Theorem 1. In
addition, this family of equilibria is unique among the affine
class of policies.
Proof: The result follows from Lemma 4. Since the
receiver cannot transmit information related to v, the objectives
of both players reduce to the minimization of E[(u−γdU (r))2].
The minimum can be attained by employing an affine function
of u at the encoder. This gives the family of equilibria
characterized in Theorem 1 which is unique among the affine
class of policies.
Remark 4: In fact, employing any invertible function f(u)
at the sender also yields a Stackelberg equilibrium. Since the
receiver knows the commitment of the sender, it can simply
employ f−1(r) to perfectly recover u.
Remark 5: While the Stackelberg equilibrium is always
informative, i.e., the sender uses the pair of parameters (x, y)
in constructing its message, the Nash equilibrium can be
noninformative or informative which are characterized in
Theorem 1.
III. THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE
In this section, we provide a discussion on the multidimen-
sional parameter setting. In particular, the private and nonpri-
8vate parameters as well as the message to be transmitted are
multidimensional. We focus on the noiseless communication
setting and we impose no power constraint at the sender
to simplify the problem. Similar to the scalar setting, the
objective functions of the sender and receiver are defined as3
Je(γe, γdX , γdY ) = −δE[‖x− xˆ‖2] + E[‖y − yˆ‖2], (31)
Jd(γe, γdX , γdY ) = E[‖x− xˆ‖2] + E[‖y − yˆ‖2]. (32)
A. Nash Equilibria
In this subsection, we investigate the multidimensional
setting under the Nash equilibrium concept. In particular, we
derive a pair of fixed point equations by imposing a certain
constraint. We begin with characterizing the best responses.
Lemma 5: If the sender is affine in the form of z =
γe(x,y) = Ax + By + C, then the receiver is also affine
and it is expressed as
γdX (r) =
(
ΣXXA
T + ΣXY B
T
)(
AΣXXA
T +BΣY Y B
T
+AΣXY B
T +BΣY XA
T
)−1
(r − C), (33)
γdY (r) =
(
ΣY Y B
T + ΣY XA
T
)(
AΣXXA
T +BΣY Y B
T
+AΣXY B
T +BΣY XA
T
)−1
(r − C). (34)
Lemma 6: If the decoding policies are affine in the form of
γdX (r) = Kr + L and γdY (r) = Mr + L, where MTM −
δKTK is positive definite, then the encoder is also affine and it
is expressed as z = −δ(MTM−δKTK)−1KTx+(MTM−
δKTK)−1MTy + (MTM − δKTK)−1(δKTL−MTN).
Proof: By completing the squares technique, the opti-
mization problem at the encoder can be expressed as
min
z=γe(x,y)
E
[(
(MTM − δKTK)z − (MT (y −N)
−δKT (x− L))
)T
(MTM − δKTK)−1(
(MTM − δKTK)z − (MT (y −N)− δKT (x− L))
)]
.
Since (MTM − δKTK) is assumed to be positive definite,
the result immediately follows.
It is noted that the best response characterization for the
encoder is given under a constraint on M and K. If this
condition is not met, the completion of the squares technique
does not work and also the problem becomes nonconvex.
The condition of (MTM − δKTK) being positive definite
translates to M2 − δK2 > 0 in the scalar case, and this case
yields the affine Nash equilibrium in the scalar setting (see
Theorem 1).
The next step is to combine these best responses to express
the fixed point equations which need to be satisfied at a Nash
equilibrium. We specialize to linear policies for simplicity by
setting all the elements of L and N to zero.
3It is noted that one may also consider distortions of the form E[(x −
xˆ)TP (x − xˆ)] and E[(y − yˆ)TQ(y − yˆ)] where P and Q are positive
definite matrices. The results in this section generalize to this case without
any loss since it is possible to convert these distortions to the ones in (31) and
(32) by applying appropriate linear transformations to the random variables.
Theorem 4: Consider linear decoding policies γdX (z) =
Kz and γdY (z) = Mz. If a set of linear decoding policies
with MTM − δKTK being positive definite and, M and K
satisfying
K = (ΣXYM − δΣXXK)(δ2KTΣXXK +MTΣY YM
− δKTΣXYM − δMTΣY XK)−1(MTM − δKTK) (35)
M = (ΣY YM − δΣY XK)(δ2KTΣXXK +MTΣY YM
− δKTΣXYM − δMTΣY XK)−1(MTM − δKTK) (36)
exists, then these linear policies yield a Nash equilibrium
assuming that the sender employs its best response.
First note that in (35) and (36), with the matrices taken to
be the all zero matrices, the equations are satisfied. Thus, there
always exists an equilibrium, which is a babbling equilibrium.
The more interesting question is whether there exist infor-
mative equilibria. That there exists an equilibrium (babbling)
rules out a straightforward application of fixed point theorems,
such as Brouwer’s [43], and one needs to restrict policies to
a properly defined convex, compact set of policies strictly
outside an open ball containing babbling policies. Having
a coupled set of fixed point equations involving matrices,
positive definiteness restriction on (MTM − δKTK) and
restricting the policies not to contain the babbling policies
make it difficult the apply the standard fixed point theorems.
In the most general case of arbitrary covariance matrices, these
equations cannot be simplified to a single fixed point equation.
In the following, we state some existence results considering
special cases in terms of covariance matrices. These can be
regarded as generalizations of the results for the scalar setting
in Section II under some special circumstances.
Theorem 5: Under either of the following cases, there exist
linear Nash equilibria, which are payoff dominant equilibria.
(i) For independent pairs of observations
(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn), transmitting their pairwise
linear combinations u1, . . . , un, where ui is as in (21)
with parameters xi and yi, yields a payoff dominant
Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Consider pairs of observations (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn),
where xi = αix1 and yi = αiy1 for i = 2, . . . , n
and nonzero scalars αi. Then, transmitting the linear
combination u specified by (21) with parameters x1 and
y1 yields a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium.
Proof:
(i) The idea is to apply the equivalent formulation employed
in the proof of Theorem 1 to every (xi, yi) pair. After
applying this transformation (i.e., applying (21) and
(22) to every (xi, yi) pair), we obtain the following
pairs of random variables (u1, v1), . . . , (un, vn). Since
(xi, yi) and (xj , yj) for i 6= j are independent pairs,
(ui, vi) and (uj , vj) become independent pairs, as well.
In addition, as a result of the applied transformation
ui and vi are also independent for i = 1, . . . , n.
Equipped with these independence observations, we can
now invoke Lemma 3 which implies that the sender does
not send any information related to v1, . . . , vn at a Nash
equilibrium. As a result, the sender transmits u1, . . . , un
to obtain an informative Nash equilibrium.
9(ii) Suppose that the transformation in (21) and (22) is
applied to every (xi, yi) pair. As a result, we obtain pairs
(u1, v1), . . . , (αnun, αnvn). From Lemma 3, we know
that the sender cannot transmit information related to
v1 (as well as v2, . . . , vn since these are simply scaled
versions of v1) at a Nash equilibrium. Then, both players
want the receiver to perfectly recover u1, . . . , un. If
the sender transmits u1, then the receiver can perfectly
recover u2, . . . , un. Thus, the sender transmits u1 to
obtain an informative Nash equilibrium.
Remark 6: Consider the scenario in (i) of Theorem 5. Note
that it is possible to construct Nash equilibria by only sending
a subset of u1, . . . , un. Notice that in that case the equilibria
are no longer payoff dominant equilibria.
Theorem 5 explicitly characterizes Nash equilibria consider-
ing special covariance matrix structures. Investigation of other
covariance matrix structures remains a topic of future work.
It is noted that the objective functions in (31) and (32)
include mean squared errors corresponding to each scalar
parameter with a nonzero weighting coefficient (i.e., the co-
efficient is −δ for private parameters and 1 for nonprivate
parameters). A slight modification in the cost structure of
the sender may lead to a babbling equilibrium under special
structures of covariance matrices. In the following, we give
an example involving special structures for the cost and
covariance matrices where the nature of the equilibrium is an
noninformative one.
Example 1: Consider Je(γe, γdX , γdY ) = E[(y−yˆ)TQ(y−
yˆ)]− δ E[(x− xˆ)TP (x− xˆ)], where Q is a diagonal matrix
with positive elements except for the last element which is
zero and P is an all zero matrix except for the last diagonal
element which is positive. Suppose that the covariance matrix
of y is given by ΣY = diag(0, . . . , 0, a) for a > 0. In addition,
the last elements of x and y are correlated. In that case, the
equilibrium is noninformative since the sender cannot transmit
information related to the last element of y and the other
elements of y are already deterministic. Namely, the problem
reduces to a zero sum game.
B. Stackelberg Equilibria
In this subsection, our main result is to show that there
always exists an informative Stackelberg equilibrium. Towards
that goal, we provide a lower bound for the performance of
the encoder under which the encoder conveys information
related to both parameters. This implies that the Stackel-
berg equilibrium should be informative since the Stackelberg
equilibrium cannot yield a performance which is worse than
this informative lower bound. In the following, we provide
an analysis building on the approach initiated in [30] where
the authors consider a slightly different setting in which side
information is available at the receiver.
Theorem 6: There always exists an informative Stackelberg
equilibrium for the multidimensional parameter setting.
Proof: We will obtain a lower bound under which the
sender conveys information to the receiver and the receiver
employs its best response. Suppose that the receiver employs
the following linear policies γdX (z) = ΣXZΣ−1ZZz and
γdY (z) = ΣY ZΣ
−1
ZZz. Notice that these are the optimal min-
imum mean squared error estimators for jointly Gaussian ran-
dom vectors. Thus, if the sender is linear, the optimal response
of the receiver is given by these equations. Then, the mean
squared errors for estimating each parameter can be written
as E[‖x− ΣXZΣ−1ZZz‖] = Tr(ΣXX − ΣZXΣXZΣ−1ZZ) and
E[‖y − ΣY ZΣ−1ZZz‖] = Tr(ΣY Y − ΣZY ΣY ZΣ−1ZZ). Thus,
the aim is to minimize Tr(ΣY Y −δΣXX−ΣZY ΣY ZΣ−1ZZ +
δΣZXΣXZΣ
−1
ZZ) over ΣXZ , ΣY Z and ΣZZ under an im-
plicit constraint that the covariance matrix of [xT ,yT , zT ]T is
positive semi-definite. Without loss of generality, we assume
that ΣZZ = I since it is possible to scale the message without
changing the objective. Namely, if z with particular values of
ΣXZ , ΣY Z and ΣZZ is feasible, then z˜ = Σ
−1/2
ZZ z is also
feasible with ΣZ˜Z˜ = I , and z and z˜ induce the same cost.
Since we are looking for a lower bound, let us assume
that z is scalar. Thus, after defining u ,
[
ΣXZ
ΣY Z
]
and
Q ,
[
ΣXX ΣXY
ΣY X ΣY Y
]
, the optimization problem at the sender
can be written as
min
u
uTdiag(δI,−I)u, subject touTQ−1u ≤ 1, (37)
where the constraint is due to positive semi-definiteness
condition expressed using Schur’s complement. If we write
Q = P 2 and apply a transformation of variables, we obtain
an equivalent optimization problem
min
u˜
u˜TPdiag(δI,−I)P u˜, subject to u˜T u˜ ≤ 1. (38)
Since we can show that Pdiag(δI,−I)P has at least one
negative eigenvalue, the optimal solution should yield a neg-
ative objective value. For a particular u˜ with ‖u˜‖ < 1
and u˜TPdiag(δI,−I)P u˜ < 0, we can apply a scaling to
improve the objective as follows: If v = αu˜ where α =
1/‖u˜‖, we have that ‖v‖ = 1 and vTPdiag(δI,−I)Pv <
u˜TPdiag(δI,−I)P u˜. Thus, the constraint should be satisfied
with equality. Then, the problem reduces to a special instance
of Courant-Fischer-Weyl minimax principle [44, p.58]. In
particular, for a real and symmetric matrix A, we have λmin ≤
(xTAx)/(xTx) ≤ λmax for all nonzero x where the lower and
upper bounds are attained by eigenvectors of A corresponding
to the smallest and largest eigenvalues, respectively. Thus,
the normalized eigenvector of Pdiag(δI,−I)P corresponding
to the smallest eigenvalue solves (38). As a result, we get[
ΣXZ
ΣY Z
]
= P u˜∗ where u˜∗ is the optimal solution to (38) and
this can be attained via a linear encoding policy (Recall that
this solution satisfies the positive semi-definiteness condition
for the covariance matrix of x, y and z.). Notice that P u˜∗
cannot be identically zero since this contradicts with the
optimal objective value in (38) being negative.
Hence, a set of policies in which the sender conveys infor-
mation and the receiver employs its best response is found.
This characterization gives a lower bound on the Stackelberg
equilibrium as there is a linear policy restriction as well as a
scalar message restriction. Since an informative lower bound
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for the Stackelberg equilibrium is found, it follows that there
always exists an informative Stackelberg equilibrium.
In addition to the existence result of Theorem 6, we can in
fact explicitly characterize the equilibria considering special
covariance matrix structures. In particular, the Nash equilibria
characterized in Theorem 5 of this manuscript coincide with
the Stackelberg equilibria. As in the scalar setting, these char-
acterized equilibria do not make an a priori affine restriction
at the encoder and affine equilibria arise from its optimality
property.
IV. GAUSSIAN INFORMATION BOTTLENECK PROBLEM
INTERPRETED WITH THE PAPER’S FORMULATION
We now revisit the information bottleneck problem [40],
which is a popular framework in the current literature, as an
instance of our formulation under the Stackelberg equilibrium
concept in the following sense: in contrast to privacy game
setup, only the parameter x is observed at the sender in
the information bottleneck setup. In particular, we provide an
estimation theoretic perspective on the information bottleneck
problem. The information bottleneck problem considers a
similar objective to that employed in this manuscript where
the performance metrics involve mutual information rather
than the mean squared error. In the information bottleneck
problem, the aim is to compress an observed random variable
while trying to preserve information related to a correlated
random variable. These conflicting objectives are analyzed
by formulating an optimization problem involving the mutual
information between the considered random variables. More
specifically, the aim is to find the optimal solution to the
following optimization problem:
min
z=γe(x)
I(x; z)− βI(y; z). (39)
The information bottleneck problem considering jointly Gaus-
sian multidimensional sources is studied in [41] where the
structure of the optimal solution, which is jointly Gaussian
with x [45], is identified. The objective function in (39)
resembles the objective function considered in this manuscript
in the sense that in both problems the parameter y is desired
to be conveyed while information related to the parameter x
is desired to be removed from the displayed message.
The information bottleneck problem can in fact be viewed
as a Stackelberg game between a sender and a receiver. In
this game, the sender wants to compress the observed random
variable and to convey the unobserved random variable. The
use of mutual information as a performance metric effectively
means that the receiver uses all the available information
related to both of the parameters, i.e., it always employs
its best response as in the Stackelberg equilibrium. Thus,
the receiver is concerned with extracting information related
to both of the parameters, which is also the case in our
framework.
In the following, we consider a setting which is similar
to the information bottleneck technique by employing mean
squared error terms as our metric. As in the information
bottleneck framework, the sender observes only the parameter
x, rather than observing both parameters. Namely, the encoder
has access to only partial information and is of the form
z = γe(x). The objective functions of the sender and receiver
are as defined in (31) and (32), respectively. In addition, the
encoded random variable is directly observable by the receiver,
i.e., r = z. Since the receiver is concerned with estimating
both parameters, it employs the minimum mean squared error
estimators of each parameter. Since the equilibrium concept
is the Stackelberg equilibrium, the objective function of the
sender can be written as
Je(γe) = −δ E[‖x− E[x|z]‖2] + E[‖y − E[y|z]‖2]. (40)
Now, observe that
E[‖y − E[y|z]‖2] = E[‖y − E[y|x] + E[y|x]− E[y|z]‖2]
= E[‖y − E[y|x]‖2] + E[‖E[y|x]− E[y|z]‖2]
= E[‖y − E[y|x]‖2] + E[‖E[y|x]− E[E[y|x]|z]‖2]
where the second equality follows from the fact that y−E[y|x]
is orthogonal to x and z (orthogonality with respect to z is due
to the fact that y−x−z is a Markov chain in that order) and
the third equality is due to the law of iterated expectations. By
noticing that E[y|x] = ΣY XΣ−1XXx, the objective function
can be written as Je(γe) = E[‖y − E[y|x]‖2] − δ E[‖x −
E[x|z]‖2] + E[(x − E[x|z])T (Σ−1XXΣXY ΣY XΣ−1XX)(x −
E[x|z])], where the first term is independent of the encoder.
Thus, we obtain an optimization problem of the form
min
z=γe(x)
E
[
(x− E[x|z])TM(x− E[x|z])
]
, (41)
where M , (Σ−1XXΣXY ΣY XΣ−1XX − δI). Notice that M
is symmetric and thus it is diagonalizable with orthonormal
eigenvectors. Hence, we can write M = QΛQT where Λ is a
diagonal matrix (with possibly positive and negative terms on
the diagonal). If we define x˜ = QTx, we obtain an equivalent
problem:
min
z=γe(x)
E
[
tr
(
Λ(x˜− E[x˜|z])(x˜− E[x˜|z])T
)]
. (42)
Under certain symmetry conditions, it is possible to solve the
optimization problem in (42) and we state this result in the
following theorem. Let λi denote the ith diagonal element of
Λ and x˜i denote the ith element of x˜.
Theorem 7: Depending on conditions involving M =
(Σ−1XXΣXY ΣY XΣ
−1
XX−δI), the Stackelberg equilibrium for
the information bottleneck problem is characterized as follows:
(i) If the eigenvectors of M and ΣX are completely aligned,
then the sender transmits all x˜i for which λi ≥ 0 at the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
(ii) If M is positive semi-definite, then there exists a fully
informative Stackelberg equilibrium in which the sender
transmits x.
(iii) If M is negative definite, then the Stackelberg equilib-
rium is always noninformative.
(iv) Let M be negative semi-definite with at least one eigen-
value equal to zero. Then, there exists an informative
Stackelberg equilibrium if a component x˜i for which
λi = 0 is uncorrelated with any component x˜j for
which λj < 0. Otherwise, the equilibrium is always
noninformative.
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Proof:
(i) If we write the covariance matrix of x˜, we get ΣX˜X˜ =
E[QTxxTQ] = QTΣXXQ. Since the eigenvectors of
ΣXX and M are assumed to be aligned, the covariance
matrix of x˜ becomes diagonal. Since the aim is to
minimize (42) and each component x˜i is independent
of each other, the solution becomes transmitting all x˜i
for which λi ≥ 0.
(ii) Since M is positive semi-definite, Λ contains nonneg-
ative terms. As a result, the objective function in (42)
is lower bounded by zero since all the coefficients are
nonnegative. If the sender reveals x, the receiver can
perfectly recover x˜ and this gives an objective value
of zero. Therefore, the specified encoding policy attains
the lower bound, which implies that this encoding policy
yields a Stackelberg equilibrium.
(iii) In this case, Λ becomes a diagonal matrix with all
negative elements. If the sender reveals information
about any component of x˜, the receiver would use this
information to reduce its objective. However, as all the
coefficients λi is strictly negative, revealing information
about any component of x˜ increases the objective in
(42). Thus, transmitting information related to x˜ is
not desirable for the encoder, which implies that the
Stackelberg equilibrium is noninformative.
(iv) First, consider the informative scenario. Under the given
assumption, it is possible send x˜i for which λi = 0 as
it does not reveal any information related to any xj for
which λj < 0. Thus, revealing x˜i for which λi = 0 does
not affect the cost. As a result, we get an informative
equilibrium. The noninformative scenario occurs when
the receiver is able to extract information related to xj
for which λj < 0.
The only remaining case which is not covered in Theorem 7
is when M is neither positive semi-definite nor negative semi-
definite. In the following, we show that in this remaining
scenario, there always exists an informative equilibrium. In
fact, the reduced problem in (42) can also be viewed as a
multidimensional privacy-signaling game under the Stackel-
berg equilibrium concept where x˜ is partitioned such that
the indices with negative coefficient correspond to the private
parameter and the indices with positive coefficient correspond
to the nonprivate parameter. The following result uses this
observation and Theorem 6.
Theorem 8: If M = (Σ−1XXΣXY ΣY XΣ
−1
XX − δI) has at
least one positive and at least one negative eigenvalue, then
there always exists an informative Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof: The result is established by treating the optimiza-
tion problem as a privacy game problem by appropriately
partitioning x˜ into private and nonprivate parameters based on
the sign of diagonal terms of Λ. The optimization problem in
(42) can be written as minz=γe(x)
∑n
i=1 λiE[(x˜i−E[x˜i|z])2]
where n denotes the size of the vector x˜ or equivalently x.
This equivalent problem can be viewed as a privacy game
under the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in the following
sense: We can view the components x˜i for which λi ≥ 0 as the
nonprivate parameter and the components x˜j for which λj < 0
as the private parameter. For this equivalent privacy game
formulation under the Stackelberg equilibrium concept, we use
the result of Theorem 6 to conclude that there always exist
an informative Stackelberg equilibrium for the information
bottleneck setup under the given condition in the statement
of the theorem.
In the special case of scalar sources, Theorem 7 simplifies.
In particular, depending on the value of δ, the equilibrium is
either fully informative or noninformative and we summarize
this result in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The solution of the information bottleneck
problem for scalar sources considering the Stackelberg equilib-
rium concept under the mean squared error distortion criterion
is given by one of the following cases:
1) If (ρ2/σ4X) > δ, then the sender completely reveals
x, i.e., z is an invertible function of x. Thus, the
equilibrium is fully informative.
2) If (ρ2/σ4X) < δ, then the sender does not reveal informa-
tion related to x, i.e., the equilibrium is noninformative.
3) If (ρ2/σ4X) = δ, then the sender either completely
reveals x or does not reveal any information related to
x.
The following corollaries can be regarded as a generaliza-
tion of the results for the scalar setting.
Corollary 2: Suppose that the multidimensional parameters
are in the form (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) with (xi, yi) and (xj , yj)
being independent for i 6= j. Then, at the equilibrium the
sender transmits random variables in x˜ which correspond to
positive values of Λ.
Proof: Since ΣY X is a diagonal matrix in that case, M
becomes a diagonal matrix. Then, we get the result by invoking
(i) of Theorem 7.
Corollary 3: Suppose that the multidimensional parame-
ters are in the form (x1, y1), . . . , (αnxn, αnyn) for scalars
α2, . . . , αn. Then, the solution becomes transmitting x1 (or
any xi) when the privacy ratio is smaller than the threshold
specified in Corollary 1, i.e., δ < (ρ2/σ4X). If δ = (ρ
2/σ4X),
then the fully informative and noninformative scenarios induce
the same cost as in Corollary 1. When δ > (ρ2/σ4X), the
equilibrium is noninformative.
Proof: In that case, it is easy to verify that M becomes
a diagonal matrix with the same diagonal elements. Then, the
result follows from Theorem 7.
Remark 7: In the information bottleneck problem, the sender
uses partial information since only parameter x is available at
the sender whereas in our privacy-signaling games formulation
the sender has access to both of the parameters. Due to this
further restriction that only partial information is available
at the sender, our information bottleneck analysis provides a
lower bound on the performance of our original Stackelberg
game setting in which both of the parameters are observed at
the sender.
Remark 8: It should be emphasized that the information
bottleneck problem involving mutual information corresponds
to the Stackelberg equilibrium concept since employing mutual
information effectively means that the receiver uses all the
available information, i.e., it employs its best response.
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Consequently, it is shown that the information bottleneck
problem under the mean squared error criterion can be reduced
to a minimization problem involving a weighted mean squared
error in terms of a transformed random vector. We characterize
the Stackelberg equilibrium under certain conditions. If these
conditions are not satisfied, we show that there always exists
an informative Stackelberg equilibrium.
Remark 9: It is noted that while there is a complete solution
for the information bottleneck problem [41], these results do
not apply to the information bottleneck problem under the
mean squared error cost criterion. The reason for this is as
follows. In the information bottleneck problem, there is a
flexibility of working in a transformed coordinate system as
the mutual information is not affected by a transformation as
long as it is invertible. Thus, a transformation is applied in [45]
to simplify the problem. On the other hand, in our formulation,
which uses mean squared error terms, if a transformation
is applied on the considered random variables, then this
transformation affects the costs and hence the transformation
does not simplify the problem for the vector parameter case.
In other words, if the covariance matrix of x˜ is not diagonal in
(42), it means that we cannot transform it to a random vector
with a diagonal covariance matrix while keeping the matrix Λ
diagonal.
V. NOISY CHANNEL BETWEEN THE SENDER AND THE
RECEIVER
In this section, we extend our results considering scalar pa-
rameters to two important channel settings. (In fact, Lemma 3
and Lemma 4 apply to other channel settings.) For a given
channel, the aim is to find an encoder/decoder pair that is
optimal in conveying a zero mean Gaussian source over that
particular channel in mean squared error sense. Once these
policies are obtained, applying these policies to convey the
linear combination u specified by (21) yields a Nash equi-
librium as well as a Stackelberg equilibrium. The following
builds on this observation.
A. Gaussian Noise Channel between the Sender and the
Receiver
In this subsection, we consider the same problem as in
Section II except that there is an additive Gaussian noise (e.g.,
measurement noise) between the transmitter and the receiver.
More specifically, the sender encodes x and y into z which
is subject to additive noise w independent of x and y and the
receiver uses the observation r = z + w while decoding both
of the random variables. The additive noise term is modeled as
zero mean Gaussian with variance σ2W . As before, the encoded
random variable takes real values and there is an average
power constraint at the sender, i.e., E[z2] ≤ P .
1) Nash Equilibria: Notice that the equivalent formulation
employed in the proof of Theorem 1 is also applicable in
the noisy communication scenario. The following theorem
uses this observation to prove that a payoff dominant Nash
equilibrium is attained by linear policies.
Theorem 9:
(i) The encoding policies γe(x, y) = C for all |C| ≤ √P
and the decoding policy γdX (r) = 0 and γdY (r) = 0
form a noninformative Nash equilibrium.
(ii) The encoding policy
γe(x, y) =
α
[(
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y ) +
√
(δσ2X + σ
2
Y )
2 − 4δρ2
2δρ
)
y − x
]
(43)
yields an informative Nash equilibrium where α is a
scaling coefficient that is either positive or negative
such that E[γe(x, y)2] = P holds. The corresponding
decoding policies at this equilibrium are given by
γdX (r) =
(
Aσ2X +Bρ
P + σ2w
)
r, (44)
γdY (r) =
(
Aρ+Bσ2Y
P + σ2w
)
r, (45)
where A and B denote the coefficients in front of x and
y, respectively, for the encoding policy in (43).
(iii) This informative equilibrium is a payoff dominant Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, it is unique among the affine
class of policies.
Proof: Lemma 3 implies that the sender is restricted
to send u. Then, it is easy to verify that sending u after
scaling up to the maximum available power level yields a
Nash equilibrium. The decoding policies at this equilibrium
are given by the minimum mean squared error estimators
corresponding to each parameter. Since the observation r is
jointly Gaussian with x and y, the conditional expectation
formula for Gaussian distributions can be employed to obtain
(44) and (45) [46, p. 155].
The proof for the payoff dominance property of the equilib-
rium uses the observation that the performance of both players
is determined by E[(u−γdU (r))2] at a Nash equilibrium. Since
the source is scalar and the Gaussian noise is additive, we can
employ the well-known result that the problem of transmitting
a scalar Gaussian source over a scalar Gaussian channel under
an average power constraint admits an optimal solution with
linear encoding scaled to satisfy the power constraint with
equality (see e.g. [47, p. 376]). Hence, the result immediately
follows.
The proof for uniqueness is similar to the proof of Theo-
rem 1 except that in the noisy case the encoding policy must
be linear in u and all the available power needs to be used.
2) Stackelberg Equilibria:
Theorem 10: The Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with
the informative Nash equilibrium characterized in Theorem 9.
This equilibrium is unique among any set of policies.
Proof: Lemma 4 implies that the encoder cannot use v
and it can only use u in constructing its message. As the
objectives of each player then becomes the minimization of the
mean squared error for estimating u, the optimal strategy of
the sender is to employ an encoding policy which is linear in u
with average power equal to P (see the proof of Theorem 9).
In addition, this encoding strategy is unique due to the fact
that it is the unique solution to the problem of transmitting a
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scalar Gaussian source over a scalar Gaussian channel under
an average power constraint [47].
It is important to emphasize that the encoder is not restricted
to be affine. Since the problem reduces to transmitting a scalar
Gaussian source over a scalar Gaussian channel under an
average power constraint, we obtain these linear policies as
the optimal unique solution to this reduced problem.
B. Discrete Noiseless Channel between the Sender and the
Receiver
In this subsection, we investigate the discrete channel setting
where the sender is restricted to transmit a discrete value, i.e.,
z ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1} for some M ≥ 2. We assume that the
channel is noiseless, i.e., r = z.
1) Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria: While investigating
the discrete channel setting, we employ the equivalent formu-
lation which facilitates the analysis. In this equivalent formu-
lation, after determining γ˜e(u, v) for the sender and γdU (r)
and γdV (r) for the receiver, one can completely express the
encoding and decoding policies at the equilibrium using (21)-
(24).
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 imply that both players share
the common objective of minimizing E[(u − γdU (r))2] un-
der both of the equilibrium concepts. Since the sender is
restricted to transmit discrete values, it is required to quantize
u at the sender. Since this would correspondence to classical
quantization, that an optimal quantizer exists follows from
classical results in the literature, e.g. [48]. Namely, there exist
quantization bins and reconstruction points which minimize
the corresponding mean squared error. Thus, by assigning each
bin to a discrete value of z and then using the corresponding
optimal reconstruction points at the receiver yield a Nash equi-
librium. We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 11: Consider the quantization of u into M bins
where each bin is assigned to a discrete value of z at the
encoder and the corresponding reconstruction points at the
receiver such that E[(u−γdU (r))2] is minimized. This pair of
encoding and decoding policies, which always exists, forms
an informative Nash equilibrium. In addition, this equilibrium
is a payoff dominant equilibrium.
It is worth to point out that for any number of bins less than
M , there exists a Nash equilibrium. In other words, even if z
can take M discrete values, a quantization policy using less
than M bins at the sender and the corresponding reconstruction
points at the receiver is also a Nash equilibrium. In addition,
the case of single bin is also a Nash equilibrium in which no
information related to u is conveyed to the receiver.
It is noted that using a large number of bins yields lower
E[(u−γdU (r))2]. Since the mean squared error for estimating
u is desired to be minimized for both players, using a large
number of bins results in improved objectives for both players.
This monotonicity property with respect to the number of bins
implies that in the Stackelberg equilibrium there must be M
bins.
Theorem 12: The pair of policies in Theorem 11 is also a
Stackelberg equilibrium.
Remark 10: The performance of both players at the equi-
librium in the discrete channel setting for finite M is strictly
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Fig. 3. Mean squared errors for private and nonprivate parameters at the
equilibrium with respect to privacy ratio for different noise levels, where
ρ = 0.75.
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Fig. 4. Mean squared errors for private and nonprivate parameters at the
equilibrium in the absence of noise with respect to correlation between x and
y for different values of privacy ratio.
worse than the performance at the characterized family of
equilibria in the noiseless setting in Section II. This is due
to the fact that the term E[(u − γdU (r))2] is strictly greater
than zero in this case whereas it is zero in the noiseless case.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, the proposed privacy-signaling game prob-
lem is investigated through numerical examples, where the
following scenario is considered: The variances of the private
and nonprivate parameters are set as σ2X = σ
2
Y = 1, and
the average power level constraint at the sender is given by
P = 1. In the following, we illustrate the performances at the
characterized equilibria. Since the informative Nash equilibria
coincides with the Stackelberg equilibria, we do not make a
distinction between them.
Fig. 3 plots the estimation errors for the private and
nonprivate parameters with respect to the privacy ratio. The
estimation error for the private parameter increases with the
privacy ratio since the transmitter removes information related
to the private parameter due to enhanced privacy concerns.
This removal also distorts the information conveyed related
to the nonprivate parameter and hence the corresponding
estimation error also increases.
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TABLE I
THE RATIO OF COEFFICIENTS AT THE ENCODER FOR THE DERIVED
INFORMATIVE EQUILIBRIA WHEN σ2X = 1 AND σ
2
Y = 1.
Scenario B/A
ρ = 0.3 and δ = 0.1 −36.39
ρ = 0.3 and δ = 1 −6.51
ρ = 0.3 and δ = 10 −3.63
ρ = 0.7 and δ = 0.1 −15.04
ρ = 0.7 and δ = 1 −2.44
ρ = 0.7 and δ = 10 −1.50
Fig. 4 plots the estimation errors for the private and non-
private parameters with respect to the correlation between
them. In the low privacy scenario, the estimation error for
y does not change significantly with respect to the correlation
since most of the information contained in y is conveyed
to the receiver regardless of the correlation. As a result,
more information is leaked related to the private parameter
as the correlation is increased. In contrast, in the high privacy
scenario, regardless of the correlation, most of the information
related to x is removed from the transmitted message. Thus,
the estimation error for the nonprivate parameter increases
with the correlation whereas no significant changes in the
estimation error for the private parameter are observed.
Finally, Table I illustrates the tradeoff between utility in
terms of conveying y and privacy in terms of hiding x by
providing the structure of the encoder at the equilibrium for
various values of the privacy ratio and correlation. It can
be inferred that if the privacy ratio is increased while the
correlation is kept the same, the information leakage related
to the private parameter reduces, as expected.
VII. CONCLUSION
A communication setting between a sender with privacy
concerns and a receiver has been investigated in a game
theoretic framework. The private and nonprivate parameters
have been modeled as jointly Gaussian random variables.
Under a noiseless communication setting, it has been shown
that a payoff dominant Nash equilibria is attained by affine
policies for scalar sources. It has been proven that the char-
acterized Nash equilibria form also a Stackelberg equilibrium.
These results have been further generalized to the Gaussian
noisy channel setting as well as a discrete noiseless channel
setting. Furthermore, it has been shown that there always exists
informative Stackelberg equilibria considering the case when
the parameters are multidimensional. We have also provided an
estimation theoretic perspective on the information bottleneck
problem under the Stackelberg equilibrium concept. We have
characterized the equilibria for the multidimensional parameter
setting under certain conditions and we have established the
existence of informative equilibria considering the case when
these conditions are not met.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Given the encoding policy, the optimization problem at
the receiver decouples over γdX (·) and γdY (·). Consequently,
the optimal decoders at the receiver become minimum mean
squared error estimators of each parameter which leads to the
expressions in (11) and (12) [46, p. 155].
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Considering the decoders specified in the statement of the
lemma, the optimization problem that the sender needs to solve
becomes (see (1))
min
z=γe(x,y), E[z2]≤P
E[(Mz +N − y)2]− δ E[(Kz + L− x)2].
(46)
Suppose first that M2 = δK2 holds. As a result, the
optimization problem in (46) reduces to
min
z=γe(x,y), E[z2]≤P
−E[z(M(y −N)− δK(x− L))]. (47)
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality can be employed to conclude that
the optimal solution to (47) is given by the encoder expressed
in (14).
Now suppose that M2 6= δK2 holds. In this case, omitting
the terms that do not depend on z, the optimization problem
in (46) can be written as
min
z=γe(x,y), E[z2]≤P
(M2 − δK2)
× E
[(
z − M(y −N)− δK(x− L)
M2 − δK2
)2]
. (48)
It is seen that when M2 > δK2, the goal becomes
minimizing the expectation term under the constraint on the
average transmit power and considering this case the optimal
encoding policy can be found by solving
min
z=γe(x,y), E[z2]≤P
E[z2]− 2E
[
z
M(y −N)− δK(x− L)
M2 − δK2
]
.
(49)
The minimization problem in (49) can be solved in two steps.
Namely, we first solve the minimization problem for a fixed
average power level p and then we obtain the optimal encoding
policy by searching for the optimal average power level. More
explicitly, the optimization problem in (49) can equivalently
be expressed as
min
p≤P
min
z=γe(x,y), E[z2]=p
p− 2E
[
z
M(y −N)− δK(x− L)
M2 − δK2
]
.
(50)
In order to characterize the solution to the inner minimization
problem, Cauchy-Schwarz inequality can be employed. As
a result, we get z = αM(y−N)−δK(x−L)M2−δK2 where α is a
nonnegative scaling term used to set the average power level to
p. Next, based on the outer minimization problem, the optimal
average power level becomes
arg min
p≤P
p− 2√p
(
E
[(
M(y −N)− δK(x− L)
M2 − δK2
)2])1/2
.
(51)
Consequently, if the average power level of z =
M(y−N)−δK(x−L)
M2−δK2 is less than P , this becomes the optimal
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encoding policy solving (49), equivalently (46), as given in
(13). Otherwise, the scaling factor α needs to be such that the
average power level is equal to P , which gives an encoding
policy as in (14).
Finally, we consider the case of M2 < δK2, which leads
to a maximization instead of a minimization and consequently
the optimal encoding policy can be obtained by solving
max
z=γe(x,y), E[z2]≤P
E[z2]− 2E
[
z
M(y −N)− δK(x− L)
M2 − δK2
]
.
(52)
In this case, the solution directly follows from Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality and it is given by z = α δK(x−L)−M(y−N)M2−δK2
where α is a nonnegative scaling term that needs to be set such
that the average power constraint is satisfied with equality.
Moreover, by noting that M2 − δK2 is negative in this case,
the optimal encoding policy can be written as in (14).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Since the case of A 6= 0 and B = 0 yields an informative
Nash equilibrium (as long as the average power constraint
is satisfied and the receiver employs its best response), it
is required to show that A does not converge to zero and
B converges to zero. In order to express fixed point it-
erations considering the equivalent formulation, Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 can be employed after making appropriate
substitutions. Denote the coefficients at the encoder after the
nth iteration by A(n) and B(n). If (A(n))2σ4U > δ˜(B
(n))2σ4V
and the average encoding power is less than or equal to P ,
then the fixed point iterations become
A(n+1) =
A(n)σ2U
(
(A(n))2σ2U + (B
(n))2σ2V
)
(A(n))2σ4U − δ˜(B(n))2σ4V
, (53)
B(n+1) =
−δB(n)σ2V
(
(A(n))2σ2U + (B
(n))2σ2V
)
(A(n))2σ4U − δ˜(B(n))2σ4V
. (54)
On the other hand, if these two conditions are not met, the
fixed point iterations can be expressed as
A(n+1) =
A(n)σ2U
√
P(
(A(n))2σ6U + δ˜
2(B(n))2σ6V
)1/2 , (55)
B(n+1) =
−δ˜B(n)σ2V
√
P(
(A(n))2σ6U + δ˜
2(B(n))2σ6V
)1/2 . (56)
It is noted that in either case the ratio of B(n) and A(n) satisfies
B(n+1)
A(n+1)
= −B(n)
A(n)
σ2V δ˜
σ2U
. It is seen that the convergence behavior
depends on the value of σ
2
V δ˜
σ2U
. In the following, we treat each
case separately.
1) σ
2
V δ˜
σ2U
> 1: Since |B(n)/A(n)| goes to infinity as n→∞,
B(n) cannot converge to zero while A(n) not converging
to zero.
2) σ
2
V δ˜
σ2U
= 1: In this case, only the sign of B(n)/A(n)
changes as a result of each iteration. Thus, it is not
possible to reach a case where A(n) 6= 0 and B(n) = 0.
3) σ
2
V δ˜
σ2U
< 1: This is the case for which an informative Nash
equilibrium is attained. In this case, |A(n)/B(n)| goes to
infinity as n→∞. We first consider the case when (55)
and (56) are valid as n→∞. Notice that |A(n+1)| can
be expressed as
|A(n+1)| = |A
(n)/B(n)|σ2U
√
P(
(A(n)/B(n))2σ6U + δ˜
2σ6V
)1/2 . (57)
Noting that |A(n)/B(n)| goes to infinity as n → ∞, it
is concluded from above that |A(n)| → √P/σU as n→
∞. Since |A(n)| goes to a finite value and |A(n)/B(n)|
goes to infinity, it follows that B(n) goes to zero. Now,
consider the case when (53) and (54) are valid as n→
∞. By manipulating (53), we get
|A(n+1)| =
|A(n)|σ2U
(
(A(n))2σ2U + (B
(n))2σ2V
)
(A(n))2σ4U − δ˜(B(n))2σ4V
>
|A(n)|σ2U
(
(A(n))2σ2U
)
(A(n))2σ4U
= |A(n)|
Since |A(n)| is an increasing sequence, it is guaranteed
that A(n) does not converge to zero. Also, due to the
average power constraint at the encoder, A(n) can take
only a finite value. Thus, since |A(n)/B(n)| goes to
infinity, it follows that B(n) goes to zero. Consequently,
an informative Nash equilibrium is reached in either
case.
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